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Abstract
We analyse the relations between defensive medicine and medical malpractice litigation by an
evolutionary game between physicians and patients. When medical treatment fails, patients may
suit the physician and seek compensation. Conversely, physicians may prevent negligence charges
by practising defensive medicine. We study the population dynamics and find the Nash equilibria
and their Pareto-ranking. Furthermore, we show that, when the mixed-strategy equilibrium exists,
then the shares of defensive physicians and litigious patients exhibit time-evolution paths similar to
prey-predator relations in the Lotka-Volterra model, in which physicians can be seen as preys and
litigious patients as their predators. Then, defensive physicians can be seen as adapted preys who
improved their Darwinian fitness through mutation. The increase in adapted preys (i.e. defensive
physicians) decreases predators’ fitness leading to a decrease in predators (i.e. litigious patients).
In this context, we show that perfect cooperation with neither defensive physicians nor litigious
patients can be the social first best. Our results may explain heterogeneous findings in empirical
literature on these phenomena.
Keywords: Defensive medicine; malpractice litigation; clinical risk; legal risk; predator-prey
model; evolutionary game.
1. Introduction
Medical malpractice litigation may be as old as medicine. However, it has got the attention
of economic research only in the early 1970s, when prices of malpractice insurance reached record
highs because of relevant increases in lawsuits. Defensive medicine is the practice performed by
healthcare providers to safeguard themselves from patients’ claims, while disregarding improve-
ments in patients’ health (Tancredi and Barondess, 1978; Kessler and McClellan, 1996). Through
defensive medicine, physicians can discourage patients from suing and minimise their chance of
being held liable in the event of lawsuits. It takes the form of avoidance behaviour and is called
“negative” defensive medicine when the physician refuses to perform high risk procedures. It takes
the form of assurance behaviour and is called “positive” defensive medicine when it is performed
through extra tests or procedures. Positive defensive medicine can therefore be considered as a
particular case of excessive provision of unnecessary care, and is the type that we study in this
paper.
Theoretical research often considers the inefficient provision of medical services as a principal-
agent problem and describes its market failures due to asymmetric information, moral hazard and
conflicts of interest (for early contributions see Arrow, 1963; Pauly, 1968; Zeckhauser, 1970; Pauly,
1980; see also Dionne and Contandriopoulos, 1985; Hammer, Haas-Wilson and Sage, 2001). The
literature generally agrees that physicians’ behaviour does not perfectly fit the neoclassical theory of
firms, because of the following aspects (see also McGuire, 2000). Physicians tend to maximise their
profits but may also give up some income to promote patients’ welfare. This altruism is consistent
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with the income/leisure tradeoff that determines labour supply in neoclassical microeconomics. The
quantity of medical treatment is not directly contractible and can be set by physicians (which decide
time and effort) in partial response to self-interest and subject to demand constraints proportional
to the benefits of patients. Physicians can encourage unnecessary healthcare to maximise their
profits, by increasing their observable effort when treating insured patients (Ma and McGuire,
1997) or by increasing their unobservable effort and observable care to prevent patients from
switching to a competitor in case of adverse medical outcomes (Allard, Le´ger and Rochaix, 2009).
This latter over-treatment can be considered a contingent form of positive defensive medicine.
Superfluous but profitable therapies are more likely when physicians are less fearful of liability
(Currie and MacLeod, 2008). As regards negative defensive medicine, maximising profits can also
induce physicians to under-provide services to the high severity patient if they face liability (Ellis
and McGuire, 1986; Ma, 1994; Ellis, 1998; Feess, 2012). Physicians can perform defensive medicine
also because of fear of reputational losses (Quinn, 1998; Madara´sz, 2012). Stricter negligence
standards can lead to more defensive but less negligent medicine and this response may increase
social welfare (Olbrich, 2008; contra Gal-Or, 1999).
Researchers generally agree that defensive medical practices are widespread and produce social
costs that are not trivial, though not easy to estimate (see among others Kessler and McClel-
lan, 1996; Dubay, Kaestner and Waidmann, 1999, 2002; Fenn, Gray and Rickman, 2004; Studdert
et al., 2005; Fenn, Gray and Rickman, 2007; Currie and MacLeod, 2008; Sloan and Shadle, 2009).
Medical malpractice claims and the related costs can vary significantly over time and geograph-
ically (Robinson, 1986; Black, 1990; Danzon, 1990; Studdert et al., 2000; Kessler, Summerton
and Graham, 2006; Rodwin et al., 2008). Empirical evidence indicates that liability system can
influence defensive medical practices (Kessler and McClellan, 2002a,b; Kessler, 2011; Lakdawalla
and Seabury, 2012) and the costs of medical malpractice insurance (Danzon, 1985; Danzon, Pauly
and Kington, 1990; Danzon, 1991), but the impact of tort reforms is still theoretically ambiguous
(Avraham and Schanzenbach, 2010).
The previous theoretical literature has a gap in explaining the heterogeneous findings of em-
pirical research, outlined above, on the impact assessment of defensive medicine and medical mal-
practice litigation. We fill this gap by adopting an evolutionary perspective that accounts for the
different time dynamics of these phenomena, and by studying the effects of changes in clinical,
legal and economic variables. We propose an original bimatrix game, in which patients can choose
to litigate or not if injured, and physicians to defend or not against possible liability by means
of additional superfluous medical care. The population dynamics result from a series of one-shot
encounters between randomly-drawn members of each population. Over time, agents attempt
to improve their expected payoffs by imitating successful behaviours; we describe this learning-
by-imitation process with the replicator dynamics, a tool widely used in economic literature (see
Maynard Smith and Price, 1973; Taylor and Jonker, 1978; Taylor, 1979; Maynard Smith, 1982; Hof-
bauer and Sigmund, 1988; Fudenberg and Harris, 1992; Bjornerstedt and Weibull, 1993; Kandori,
Mailath and Rob, 1993; Hofbauer and Weibull, 1996; Weibull, 1997; Schlag, 1998; Hofbauer and
Schlag, 2000; Hauert et al., 2002a,b; Hauert and Doebeli, 2004; for a review Ohtsuki and Nowak,
2006).
We find that shares of litigious patients and defensive physicians can be cyclical over time and
their average values may be invariant over the cycle. This cyclical evolution resembles predator-
prey dynamics in Lotka-Volterra models where litigious patients can be seen as predators and
physicians as their preys; then, physicians who perform defensive medicine can be seen as adapted
preys who improved their Darwinian fitness through mutation. Surprisingly, neither clinical risk
nor defensive costs tend to affect the average share of defensive physicians over the cycle, and the
same invariance exists between legal costs and the average share of litigious patients. Finally, we
demonstrate that any mixed-strategy equilibrium is always sub-optimal with respect to perfect
cooperation with neither defensive physicians nor litigious patients. Perfect cooperation can also
be the social first-best when either the harm for patients from defensive medicine is high enough,
or the probability of clinical failure is low enough.
Our paper makes an advance in describing the legal, clinical and economic drivers of “positive”
defensive medicine and medical malpractice litigation, and can help to explain heterogeneous results
of empirical literature on these phenomena. Our results suggest that policy makers should pay
attention to the overall underlying dynamics of these phenomena and be cautious when interpreting
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their short-term trends, which can be irregular.
2. The Model
We propose an evolutionary game between a population of physicians and a population of
patients. In each instant of time t ∈ [0,+∞), there is a large number of random pairwise encounters
between physicians and patients. In each encounter, a physician provides a health service to
a patient. The healthcare process can fail with probability p or reach a desirable outcome with
probability 1−p. If the healthcare process fails, the patient suffers a damage R and can choose, at a
cost CL, to suit the physician for negligence. If winning the case, the patient gets full compensation
R from the physician. If losing, the patient must pay K to the physician as reparation for legal
and reputation losses.
The outcome of the legal proceedings is uncertain and depends on the medical care previously
provided by the physician. The best medical practice costs the physician an effort CND. The
defensive medical practice costs the physician a higher effort CD > CND, it causes a harm H to the
patient and it keeps unchanged the probability of failure p in the healthcare process. In the event
of lawsuit, if the physician provided the best medical care, the patient wins with probability qND
and the physician wins with probability 1 − qND. Conversely, if the physician provided defensive
medicine, the patient wins with probability qD and the physician wins with probability 1− qD. We
assume qD < qND, that is defensive medicine protects the physician in court.
2.1. The one-shot game
In each instant of time t ∈ [0,+∞), a randomly-chosen patient plays a one-shot game with a
randomly-chosen physician. The physician can play two pure strategies, D or ND, representing
respectively performing defensive medicine or not. The patient can play two pure strategies, L or
NL, representing respectively litigating or not in case of medical failure. Each player chooses the
strategy without knowing ex ante the other player’s choice.





























The payoff matrices contain the following notation: CD and CND are the physician’s costs of
strategies D and ND, respectively; R is both the patient’s damage from failure in the healthcare
process and the compensation paid by the physician if the patient wins the lawsuit; K is the
compensation paid by the patient if the physician wins the lawsuit; qD and qND are the probabilities
that the physician loses (and that the patient wins) the lawsuit with physician’s strategies D and
ND, respectively; H is the patient’s harm from defensive medicine; CL is the patient’s cost of
litigation. The parameters in the payoff matrices satisfy the conditions: p, qD, qND ∈ (0, 1);
qND > qD; H, R, K, CL, CD, CND > 0; CD > CND.
2.2. Evolutionary dynamics
Let d(t) ∈ [0, 1] represent the share of physicians adopting strategy D and let l(t) ∈ [0, 1]
represent the share of patients adopting strategy L, at any time t. Consequently, 1 − d(t) and
1− l(t) represent, respectively, the shares of physicians playing strategy ND and of patients playing
strategy NL.
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The physicians’ expected payoffs from playing strategies D and ND are:
ΠD(l) = π
L





ND l + π
NL
ND (1− l),
where l and 1− l represent the probabilities that a physician is matched with a patient who plays,
respectively, strategy L or NL.











where d and 1−d represent the probabilities that a patient is matched with a physician who plays,
respectively, strategy D or ND.
The average payoffs in the populations of physicians and of patients are:
ΠPH = d ΠD(l) + (1− d) ΠND(l)
ΠPA = l ΠL(d) + (1− l) ΠNL(d)
We assume that the time evolution of d and l is described by the standard replicator dynamics,
a learning-by-imitation model of evolution widely used in economics (see among others Hofbauer
and Sigmund, 1988; Bjornerstedt and Weibull, 1993; Weibull, 1997; Schlag, 1998). The replicator
dynamics postulate that players are boundedly rational and update their choices by adopting the
relatively more rewarding behaviour that emerges from available observations of others’ behaviours.
Strategies will grow (decline) the more, the higher (lower) their payoff differential with respect to










= l(1− l) [ΠL(d)−ΠNL(d)]
(3)
where d˙ and l˙ represent the time derivatives of the shares d and l, respectively. The factors d(1−d)
and l(1− l) are always non-negative, so the signs of d˙ and l˙ will depend respectively on the signs
of the payoff differentials:
ΠD(l)−ΠND(l) = p l (qND − qD) (R+K)− CD + CND (4)
ΠL(d)−ΠNL(d) = p {(R+K) [ (qD − qND) d+ qND ]−K − CL} (5)
The payoff differential of physicians in equation (4) is an increasing function of l, meaning that
the relative performance of defensive strategy D (with respect to that of strategy ND) improves
when the population of patients becomes more litigious. Conversely, the payoff differential of
patients in equation (5) is a decreasing function of d, meaning that the relative performance of
litigious strategy L (with respect to that of strategy NL) worsens when the population of physicians
becomes more defensive.
3. Basic results
The system (3) is defined in the unit square S:
S =
{
(d, l) ∈ R2 : 0 ≤ d ≤ 1, 0 ≤ l ≤ 1
}
.
All sides of this square are invariant, namely, if the pair (d, l) initially lies on one side, then the
whole correspondent trajectory also lies on that side.
Equations (3) and (4) implies that d˙ = 0 holds if either d = 0, 1 or:
l = l :=
CD − CND
p (qND − qD) (R+K)
(6)
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where l > 0 always, and l < 1 if:
CD − CND < p (qND − qD) (R+K) (7)
Furthermore, it results d˙ > 0 for l > l and d˙ < 0 for l < l. Note that the term on the left
in inequality (7) represents the cost difference of the defensive strategy (with respect to the not-
defensive one), while the term on the right represents the expected benefit difference of the defensive
strategy when played against a litigious patient1.
Analogously, equations (3) and (5) implies that l˙ = 0 if either l = 0, 1 or:
d = d :=
qND (R+K)−K − CL
(qND − qD) (R+K)
(8)
where d > 0 holds if:
CL < R qND −K (1− qND) (9)
and d < 1 holds if:
CL > R qD −K (1− qD) (10)
It also results l˙ > 0 for d < d and l˙ < 0 for d > d. Note that the term on the left of inequalities
(9) and (10) represents the cost of the litigious strategy2, while the terms on the right represent
the patient’s expected benefit differences of the litigious strategy (with respect to the not-litigious
one) when played, respectively, against a not-defensive and a defensive physician.
According to the above considerations, the four vertices of S:
(d, l) = (0, 0), (1, 0), (0, 1), (1, 1)
are always stationary states of the dynamic system (3). In these stationary states, the populations
of physicians and patients play only one strategy. In (1, 1), all physicians play D and all patients
play L; in (0, 0), all physicians play ND and all patients play NL, and so on.
Another stationary state of the system (3) is the intersection point (d, l) of the straight lines
(6) and (8) if it belongs to the square S. If conditions (7), (9) and (10) are satisfied, it results
0 < d < 1 and 0 < l < 1, therefore (d, l) belongs to the interior of S and all the strategies D,
ND, L and NL coexist. Finally, all the points belonging to the side of S with l = 0 (respectively,
l = 1) are stationary states in the case in which l = 0 (respectively, l = 1); analogously, all the
points belonging to the side of S with d = 0 (respectively, d = 1) are stationary states if d = 0
(respectively, d = 1).
4. The taxonomy of dynamic regimes
The dynamics that may be observed under the system (3) have been completely classified
(see Hofbauer and Sigmund, 1988; Weibull, 1997). We limit our consideration to robust dynamic
regimes (that is, we do not consider the regimes occurring only if equality conditions on parameters’
values are satisfied). These regimes are illustrated in Figures 1–6. We use full dots, empty dots
and squares to represent respectively the attractors, repellors and saddle points. The conditions
giving rise to each regime are specified in the following propositions.
Proposition 1. The stationary state that is globally attractive in the interior of the square S is:
• (d, l) = (0, 0) if either inequality (7) and the opposite inequality of (9) hold (see Figure 1), or
the opposite inequalities of (7) and (9) hold (see Figure 2);
• (d, l) = (1, 1) if inequality (7) and the opposite inequality of (10) hold (see Figure 3);
1When a physician is matched with a not-litigious patient, the expected benefit difference is equal to zero.
2The cost of the not-litigious strategy is equal to zero; thus the value of CL can also be interpreted as the cost
difference between the litigious strategy and the not-litigious one.
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• (d, l) = (0, 1) if inequality (9) and the opposite inequality of (7) hold (see Figure 4 or 5 when
it also holds, respectively, inequality (10) or its opposite).
The interpretation of the preceding proposition is simple if we keep in mind the meaning of
conditions (7), (9) and (10).
Let us remember that inequality (7) states that the physician’s expected benefit difference of
the defensive strategy (with respect to the not-defensive one) is higher than its cost difference in
a pairwise encounter with a litigious patient3. If inequality (7) holds, then the physician’s best
responses are to defend against litigious patients and to not defend against not-litigious patients,
while the opposite inequality of (7) implies that the physicians’ dominant strategy is to not defend.
In the former case, the performance of the defensive strategy is better than that of the not-defensive
one (and, consequently, d˙ > 0 holds) when the share l of litigious patients is high enough (i.e. l > l);
vice versa if the share of litigious patients is low enough (i.e. l < l), see Figures 1 and 3. In the
latter case, the performance of the not-defensive strategy is always better than that of the defensive
one, whatever is the share l of litigious patients; consequently d˙ < 0 always holds in the interior of
the square S, as showed in Figures 2, 4 and 5.
Inequality (9) states that the patient’s cost difference of the litigious strategy (with respect to
the not-litigious one) is lower than its expected benefit difference, in a pairwise encounter with
a not-defensive physician. Similarly, inequality (10) states that the patient’s cost difference of
the litigious strategy is higher than its expected benefit difference, in a pairwise encounter with a
defensive physician.
If inequality (9) holds, then litigating is the patient’s best response against a not-defensive
physician; if inequality (10) holds, then not litigating is the patient’s best response against a
defensive physician. If both (9) and (10) are satisfied, then the performance of the litigious strategy
is better than that of the not-litigious one (and, consequently, l˙ > 0) when the share d of defensive
physicians is low enough (i.e. d < d); vice versa if the share of defensive physicians is high enough
(i.e. d > d), see Figure 4.
Note that if the opposite inequality of (9) holds, then patients’ dominant strategy is to not
litigate (l˙ < 0 always holds, see Figures 1 and 2) while if the opposite inequality of (10) holds, then
the patients’ dominant strategy is to litigate (l˙ > 0 always holds, see Figures 3 and 5).
Proposition 2. If inequalities (7), (9) and (10) hold, then there exists a (Lyapunov) stable sta-
tionary state (d, l) = (d, l) with 0 < d < 1 and 0 < l < 1, and all the trajectories in the interior of
S are closed curves surrounding it (see Figure 6).
The conditions of Proposition 2 imply that there are no dominant strategies. Figure 6 shows
that, when the interior stationary state (d, l) exists, the values d and l oscillate clockwise around
(d, l) for any initial distribution of strategies (d0, l0) 6= (d, l). The initial distribution (d0, l0) will
be reached again at the end of every cycle. The trajectories around (d, l) are cyclic because of
the signs of the payoff differentials (4) and (5) in each of the four subsets of S delimitated by the
straigth lines (6) and (8).
The interpretation of these dynamics is simple if we remember that, according to equation (4),
the relative performance of the defensive strategy D (with respect to that of the strategy ND)
improves when the population of patients becomes more litigious (i.e. the value of l increases).
Conversely, according to equation (5), the relative performance of the litigious strategy L (with
respect to that of the strategy NL) worsens when the population of physicians becomes more
defensive (i.e. the value of d increases). These relations are analogous to prey-predator relations
in the Lotka-Volterra model, in which physicians can be seen as preys and litigious patients as
their predators. Then, defensive physicians can be seen as adapted preys who improved their
Darwinian fitness through mutation from playing strategy ND to strategy D. The increase in
adapted preys (i.e. defensive physicians) decreases predators’ fitness (i.e. the payoff differential of
litigious patients) leading to a decrease in predators (i.e. litigious patients).
3Note that the not-defensive strategy is always the best reply against the not-litigious strategy.
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Table 1: Monotonic relations between equilibrium shares and their parameters
d l d l
p — ↓ K ↓ ↓
qND ↑ ↓ CND — ↓
qD ↑ ↑ CD — ↑
R ↑ ↓ CL ↓ —
Legenda: ↑ Increasing, ↓ Decreasing, — Independent
5. Nash equilibria
A well-known result in evolutionary game theory (see Weibull, 1997, pp. 163-171) is the fol-
lowing. The vertices (0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 1), when attractive, and the interior stationary state (d, l),
when existing, are Nash equilibria. By Propositions 1 and 2, the one-shot game represented by the
payoff matrices (1) and (2) always admits a unique Nash equilibrium. As usual, we can interpret
Nash equilibria as social conventions in the sense of Lewis (1969); that is, as a customary and
expected state of things in which no single individual has an incentive to modify her choices if the
others do not modify theirs.
The Nash-equilibrium property of the interior state (d, l) does not depend on its stability, as
opposed to the pure population stationary states (0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 1), which are Nash equilibria only
if locally attractive. Another difference is that (d, l) is a mixed strategy equilibrium; that is, each
available strategy is played by a positive share of the two populations. In the static interpretation of
the one-shot game, (d, l) corresponds to the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium where the physician
plays strategies D and ND with probabilities d and 1 − d, respectively, and the patient plays
strategies L and NL with probabilities l and 1− l, respectively. Another way to interpret (d, l) is
as a proxy for the average values of shares d and l over the periodic time-evolution paths observed
along the closed trajectories in Figure 6. In this sense, the interior equilibrium can estimate the
behaviour of individuals in random observations over long time periods (see Weibull, 1997).
The closed-form of the trajectories around (d, l) in Figure 6 does not hold in general but
depends on the standard replicator equations (3) that we have used. Alternatively, we could use
the adjusted replicator dynamics of Maynard Smith (1982) (see also Weibull, 1997, p. 172) under
which the stationary state (d, l) may become globally attractive or repulsive in the interior of S.
If repulsive, every trajectory starting from an initial state (d0, l0) 6= (d, l) will oscillate repeatedly
counter-clockwise around the point (d, l) having the boundary of S as ω-limit set. Thus, under
the adjusted replicator dynamics, the point (d, l) still keeps its importance as either the long-term
equilibrium (if attractive) or as a rough proxy for the averages values of d and l over time (if
repulsive).
6. Comparative Statics
The influence of parameter variations on the interior stationary state (d, l) depends on the signs
of the partial derivatives of functions (6) and (8), representing the interior equilibrium shares of
defensive physicians and litigious patients. The results are summarized in Table 1.
Surprisingly, the equilibrium share of defensive physicians d does not depend on the costs of
their strategies CND and CD nor on clinical risk p, which yet affect patients’ equilibrium share.
Conversely, the equilibrium share of litigious patients l does not depend on the cost of their strategy
CL, which yet affects physicians’ equilibrium share. These paradoxical results can be explained
by the predator-prey relation between patients and physicians. Accordingly, an evolutionary ad-
vantage for a species can be completely offset by a consequent mutation of its competitors. For
example, a decrease in patients’ legal costs CL would, ceteris paribus, push the share of litigious
patients above the equilibrium level; as a reaction, the share of defensive physicians permanently
increases, bringing back the share of litigious patients to its previous equilibrium.
The counter-intuitive results can also be explained by means of risk theory. The differential
cost of defensive strategy CD − CND can be seen as the price for increasing by qND − qD the
7
physician’s probability of winning an eventual malpractice lawsuit. Such price is fair when it
equals the physician’s expected gain from defensive medicine:
CD − CND = p l (R+K) (qND − qD) (11)
The preceding equation is equivalent to (6) and, according to equation (4), it implies ΠD(l) =
ΠND(l). The level of defensive medicine is therefore in equilibrium, with a constant share of
defensive physicians d. Indeed, physicians have no incentives to change their strategies because
they all have the same payoff. Any changes in clinical risk p or in physicians’ costs CND and CD
would, ceteris paribus, alter this equilibrium and create profit opportunities. Patients are the only
ones who can seize these opportunities by switching their strategy, because l is the only endogenous
variable in equation (11) that can restore equilibrium. The share of defensive physicians d remains
therefore stable despite these changes. Similar reasoning applied to equation (8) can show that a
change in patients’ legal costs CL affects the share of defensive physicians d rather than that of
litigious patients l.
7. Pareto-ranking of stationary states
The population average payoffs ΠPH(d, l) and ΠPA(d, l), evaluated at the stationary states (0, 0),
(1, 1) and (d, l) are respectively given by:
ΠPH(0, 0) = ΠND(0) = π
NL
ND = −CND (12)
ΠPA(0, 0) = ΠNL(0) = π
ND
NL = −R p (13)
ΠPH(1, 1) = ΠD(1) = π
L
D = −CD + p [K(1− qD)−R qD] (14)
ΠPA(1, 1) = ΠL(1) = π
D
L = −H − p [CL + (R+K)(1− qD)] (15)
ΠPH(d, l) = ΠD(l) = ΠND(l) = l p [K(1− qND)−R qND]− CND (16)
ΠPA(d, l) = ΠL(d) = ΠNL(d) = −H d −R p (17)
By comparing the above payoffs, the following proposition is straightforward.
Proposition 3. The stationary state (0, 0), when it is not attractive, Pareto-dominates:
• the interior stationary state (d, l), always when existing;
• the stationary state (1, 1), when attractive and for high enough ratios H/p.
The first part of the previous proposition holds for ΠPH(0, 0) > ΠPH(d, l), which is easily
verified by comparing equations (13) and (17), and for ΠPA(0, 0) > ΠPA(d, l), which can be verified
by comparing equations (12) and (16) and by noting that the first addend in (12) must be negative
when the state (d, l) exists, according to condition (9) in Proposition 2.
The second part of Proposition 3 holds for ΠPH(0, 0) > ΠPH(1, 1) and for ΠPA(0, 0) > ΠPA(1, 1).
By comparing equations (12) and (14), the former inequality holds if:
CD − CND > p [K(1− qD)−R qD] (18)




+R qD −K (1− qD) (19)
By Proposition 1, a necessary condition for the stationary state (1, 1) to be attractive is the opposite
inequality of (10), which implies by simple algebra the inequality (18) and, for high enough ratios
H/p, also the inequality (19).
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According to the previous proposition, perfect cooperation with neither defensive physicians nor
litigious patients is always socially preferable to any mixed-strategy equilibrium with some players
for each existing strategy. Perfect cooperation can also be the social first-best for a sufficiently
high ratio H/p, that is when either patients’ harm from defensive medicine is high enough or the
probability of clinical failure is low enough. Notably, the ratio H/p also represents the optimal
fine for harms caused by defensive physicians, if p represents their probability of being caught and
there are no fine enforcement costs, according to Polinsky and Shavell (1992).
Proposition 3 depends on the assumption that defensive medicine produces a quantifiable harm
H > 0 to patients. This hypothesis is consistent with the higher costs for superfluous clinical
treatments, imposed to patients by physicians and widely reported in literature (for a review see
Kessler, 2011). However, if defensive medicine produced a direct benefit to patients (e.g. to the
hypochondriacs), any change of state would benefit a population of players at the expense of the
other. No Pareto-ranking of stationary states would therefore be possible, but the whole population
dynamics would be totally unchanged.
8. Conclusions
In the present work, we describe the population dynamics of physicians performing defensive
medicine and of patients pursuing medical malpractice litigation, by means of an evolutionary game
with exogenous legal, clinical and economic variables. We find that shares of litigious patients
and of defensive physicians can follow predator-prey dynamics, with cyclical trends of defensive
medicine and malpractice litigation. Variations in clinical risk or in legal and clinical costs can
have paradoxical consequences because of temporary divergent effects on physicians and patients.
We find that reducing clinical risk may not affect the level of defensive medicine in the long run,
but it can increase litigation by patients against doctors. Similarly, increased legal costs may not
affect litigation in the long run, but it can increase defensive medicine. These results are proved
in a dynamic setting for the first time and they may suggest new theoretical explanations to the
heterogeneous results in empirical studies on these phenomena.
We find closed-form solutions that illustrate the impact of legal, clinical and economic variables
on physician–patient relations. We demonstrate that any mixed-strategy equilibrium is always
sub-optimal with respect to perfect cooperation with neither defensive physicians nor litigious
patients. Perfect cooperation can also be the social first-best when either the harm for patients
from defensive medicine is high enough, or the probability of clinical failure is low enough.
Our system is manageable and can be extended or adapted to the different concepts of defensive
medicine in literature. It has the same dynamic properties under the alternative assumptions that
defensive medicine produces either a direct harm or benefit to patients. The model can be easily
modified to describe also the physicians’ provision of superfluous medical care for reasons other
than defensive medicine (see for example Currie and MacLeod, 2008). A limitation is that our
system excludes ethical and psychological drivers of agents’ behaviours, which can be relevant
(see for example Vincent, Phillips and Young, 1994). Our findings seem consistent with empirical
research on defensive medicine and malpractice litigation, but this needs to be confirmed in future
research. Further analyses can include the role of insurers, the impact of insurance covers for
physicians and patients, and the possibility for policy makers to achieve the social optimum.
Our analysis suggests that, in the long run, increasing safety in clinical practice can result in
persistent levels of defensive medicine and permanent increases in malpractice litigation. Policy
makers should pay attention to the overall underlying dynamics of these phenomena and be cautious
when interpreting their short-term trends, which may be irregular and misleading. The legal,
clinical and economic drivers highlighted in the paper can be properly managed to make the
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1 Physicians’ best responses:
defend against the litigious, and the inverse.
Patients’ dominant strategy: not litigate.

















2 Physicians’ dominant strategy: not defend.
Patients’ dominant strategy: not litigate.















3 Physicians’ best responses:
defend against the litigious, and the inverse.
Patients’ dominant strategy: litigate.














4 Physicians’ best responses:
defend against the litigious, and the inverse.
Patients’ best responses:
not litigate against the defensive, and the inverse.
















5 Physicians’ dominant strategy: not defend.
Patients’ dominant strategy: litigate.














6 Physicians’ dominant strategy: not defend.
Patients’ best responses:
not litigate against the defensive, and the inverse.
Figures. Dynamic regimes obtained with different parameter sets.
Legenda: d share of defensive physicians, l share of litigious patients, • attractors, ◦ repellors, □ saddle points
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